Axiomatic bargaining theory (e.g., Nash's theorem) is static. We attempt to provide a dynamic justification for the theory. Suppose a Judge or Arbitrator must allocate utility in an (infinite) sequence of two-person problems; at each date, the Judge is presented with a utility possibility set in R 2 + . He/she must choose an allocation in the set, constrained only by Nash's axioms, in the sense that a penalty is paid if and only if a utility allocation is chosen at date T which is inconsistent, according to one of the axioms, with a utility allocation chosen at some earlier date.
Introduction
Axiomatic bargaining theory is timeless. In Nash's (1950) original conception, the apparatus is meant to model a bargaining problem between two individuals, each of whom initially possesses an endowment of objects, and von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) preferences over lotteries on the allocation of these objects to the two individuals. An impasse point is defined as the pair of utilities each receives if no trade takes place, that is, if no bargain is reached (here, particular vNM utility functions are employed). Nash quickly passes to a formulation of the problem in utility space, where a bargaining problem becomes a convex, compact, comprehensive utility possibilities set, containing the impasse point. He then imposes the axioms of individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, symmetry, independence, and symmetry, and proves that the only "solution" satisfying these axioms on an unrestricted domain of problems is the Nash solution -for any problem, the utility point which maximizes the product of the individual gains from the threat point.
We say the theory is timeless, because of the independence axiom. For this axiom requires consistency in bargaining behavior between pairs of problems. What kind of experience might lead the bargainers to respect the independence axiom? Presumably, if they bargained for a sufficiently long period of time, facing many different problems, they might come across a pair of problems related as the premise of the independence axiom requires: problem S is contained in problem Q (as utility possibilities sets), the bargainers faced problem Q last year and chose allocation q ∈ Q, and it so happens that q ∈ S . It is certainly reasonable, they reason, to agree upon q when facing S this year, because of something like Le Chatelier's principle. ("If we chose q when all those allocations in Q\S were available, we effectively had decided to restrict our bargaining to S last year anyway, so let's choose q ∈ S again now.") But if this is the way that bargainers might "learn" that independence is an attractive rule, then Nash's theory seems quite unrealistic. For with an unrestricted domain of problems, how often will bargainers face two problems related as the premise of the independence axiom requires? Almost never. Indeed, this fact is often cited as an argument in favor of Nash's theorems: the independence axiom is mathematically weak because it insists on coherence of the solution only in rare pairs of cases. Therefore, the independence restriction seems like a minimal one.
Notice the same argument of timelessness does not apply to the scale invariance axiom, even though that axiom compares the behavior of the solution on pairs of problems, because that axiom is meant to model the idea that only von Neumann Morgenstern preferences count, not their particular representation as utility functions. While the independence axiom can be viewed as a behavioral axiom, the scale invariance axiom is an informational axiom.
The other axioms -individual rationality, symmetry, and Pareto -are also behavioral but not timeless in our sense. It is not a mystery why bargainers should learn to cooperate (Pareto), or that two bargainers with the same preferences (and the same strengths) and the same endowments should end up at a symmetric allocation. Likewise, individual rationality is an easily justified behavioral axiom. Thus, the critique we are proposing of Nash bargaining theory is that one of the behavioral axioms (independence) has no apparent justification via some kind of learning through history, in the presence of another axiom (unrestricted domain), which essentially precludes that learning could ever take place.
Axiomatic bargaining theory has two major applications: one to bargaining, and the other to distributive justice. Of course, Nash (1950) pioneered the first interpretation, and the second was pioneered by Thomson and Lensberg (1989) , who showed that many of the classical bargaining solutions (Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky, egalitarian) could be characterized by sets of axioms with ethical interpretations. See Roemer (1996) for a history of the subject in its two variants.
Our goal in this article is to replace the timelessness of axiomatic bargaining theory with a dynamic approach, in which decision makers learn from history. Indeed, there is, we think, an obvious judicial practice, which provides a way rendering the theory dynamic. Suppose a judge or a court or an arbitrator faces a number of cases over time.
There is a constitution that prescribes what the judicial decision must be in certain clear and polar cases. But most cases do not fit the specifications of these constitutionally described cases. So judges rely on judicial precedent or case law: they look for a case in the past that is similar in important respects, or related, to the one at hand, and decide the present case in like manner. Thus judicial precedent is a procedure providing a link to the past that is similar to the links between problems that the independence axiomand, indeed, from a formal viewpoint, the scale invariance axiom -impose.
Of course, there is a possibility that the case being considered at present time, i, has two precedent cases j and k each of which is related to i in some important way, but which were decided differently. In general, the judge cannot decide the present case in a way to satisfy both precedents, and we will represent this conflict in our formal model.
(Real judges tend to decide which precedent fits the case at hand more closely; but we will not follow this tack. Arguments occur around the proximity of various precedents to the case at hand.) Imagine, then, that there is a domain of "cases" D, which is some set of Nash-type bargaining problems (convex, compact, comprehensive sets in R 2 + ). Suppose that the domain is rich enough that there are pairs of cases related by the scale invariance axiom, and pairs of cases related by the independence axiom; there are also some symmetrical cases in D. At each date t = 1, 2, 3, . . . a case is drawn randomly by Nature, according to some probability distribution on D. This infinite sequence of cases is called a history. The judge must decide each case sequentially (here, how to choose a feasible utility allocation), and he is restricted to obey the Nash axioms. What does this mean? If the case is symmetric, he must choose a symmetric point in the case, or pay a penalty of one; for every case, he must choose a Pareto efficient point, or pay a penalty of one. If a case is related to a prior case in the history by the scale-invariance or independence axiom, and he does not choose the allocation in the present case which is consistent with his prior choice according to the salient axiom, he must pay a penalty of δ t , if the prior case appeared t periods ago, where 0 < δ < 1 is a given discount factor. (Thus, paying a penalty of one if a Pareto efficient point is not chosen in the case at hand is just a special case of this rule, because δ 0 = 1.) If a case comes up which is not symmetric and is not related to any prior case by scale invariance or independence, he can choose any Pareto efficient point with zero penalty. At each date, the judge must choose an allocation which minimizes his penalty. In general, at a given date, he may end up paying penalties with respect a number of cases in the past which are precedents, and so his penalty would be a sum of the form P i∈P δ t , for some set of non-negative integers P .
Now suppose that we consider a domain D where Nash's theorem is true: that is, -that is, if and only if history is discounted at a sufficiently high rate. (Recall that the discount factor δ and the discount rate r are related by the formula δ = 1/ (1 + r) .) This is our dynamic justification of Nash's theorem.
We extend the result to somewhat more complicated penalty systems and to several other classical axiomatic bargaining theorems. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the axiomatic framework. Sections 3-5 successively deal with the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, and the egalitarian solution. 
Framework and axioms
and let ∂ * i denote the subset of Pareto-efficient points of i :
Let I(i) denote the vector of ideal points, i.e.
+ is a mapping such that for all i ∈ D, ϕ(i) ∈ i. The following axioms appear in the landmark theorems by Nash (1950) , Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) 1 A set i is comprehensive when for all x ∈ i, all y ≤ x, one has y ∈ i. 2 Vector inequalities are denoted ≥, >, À .
and Kalai (1977) :
Scale Invariance (ScInv): ∀i, j ∈ D, if j is an α-rescaling of i for some α ∈ R 2 ++ , then
Consider a finite domain D and an infinite number of periods t = 1, 2, . . . A history H is a sequence of problems and chosen points
such that at every period t, x t ∈ i t . At each t a random process picks i t ∈ D. For any given i ∈ D, the probability that i t = i may depend on the previous part of the history
The random process is said to be regular if it never ascribes a zero probability (or a probability converging to zero) to any given problem, i.e., if for every i ∈ D, there π i > 0 such that for every t ∈ N, and for every past history
.., (i t−1 , x t−1 )) , the probability that i t = i is at least π i .
At each period t the Judge chooses x t ∈ i t . His objective at each period is to minimize the penalty for this period, which is the sum of penalties incurred for a violation of each axiom. The values of such penalties, for each of the axioms, are the following (the parameters a, b, c, d, g, h are exogenous positive numbers, and 0 < δ < 1):
• (Sym) b if i t is symmetric and ϕ 1 (i t ) 6 = ϕ 2 (i t ).
•
The axioms involving a reference to past problems imply a penalty discounted by a factor δ : the farther back in the past the reference problem is, the lower the penalty.
Given a domain D and a random process selecting problems we say that the Judge converges almost surely to the solution ϕ if with probability 1 there is a date T such that for all t ≥ T, the Judge chooses ϕ(i t ).
Nash
The Nash solution, denoted N, is defined by Let i ∈ D. Condition (N) is said to hold for i if there exists a sequence j 1 , . . . j n such that j 1 = i, j n is symmetric and for all t = 1, . . . , n − 1, either
Call such a sequence a special chain beginning at i. Observe that for all i ∈ D, N(i) ∈ ∂ * i. Consider the possibility that ∂ * k is a singleton
, is symmetric, which is impossible as shown in the previous paragraph.
Therefore ∂ * k is not a singleton, implying that it contains a pointx such thatx 6 = N(k).
By convexity of k, for every point
for all y ∈ k. Letâ be a number satisfying this property forx.
Consider the asymmetric Nash solution Nâ defined by
On D, Nâ satisfies WP, ScInv and Ind but not Sym. Define a new solution ϕ as follows:
We show that ϕ satisfies all the axioms of the Nash theorem on D. It satisfies WP because its two component solutions satisfy it on their respective subdomains. It satisfies Sym because all symmetric problems are in D + and N satisfies Sym. Finally, it satisfies ScInv and Ind because a problem in D \ D + cannot be related to a problem in D + by these axioms, while on each subdomain these two axioms are satisfied.
As ϕ(k) 6 = N(k), the Nash theorem fails on D. Conversely, if the Nash theorem holds on D, then D \ D + must be empty.
We can now study the convergence of the Judge's decisions toward the Nash solution. The following proposition states that with probability one the Judge's decisions will exactly coincide with the Nash solution within a finite number of periods.
Proposition 2 Assume that the random process is regular and that Condition (N) holds
then the Judge converges almost surely to the Nash solution.
Proof. 1. Enumerate the problems in D as 1, 2, . . . , M. For each problem i define the special chain beginning at i as i, j 2 (i), ..., j n(i) (i). Consider the following sequence of problems:
At every period, the probability that this sequence will occur at the next period is, by the assumption that the random process is regular, at least
Therefore, with probability one, this sequence occurs at a finite date T .
If N(j n(1) (1)) is not chosen, the penalty will be at least min {a, b}, since either WP or Sym will be violated. If, however, N(j n(1) (1)) is chosen, this will entail at most two violations with respect to all previous choices -namely, for any previous date, a violation of ScInv and/or Ind. So the worst penalty that can be incurred is (c + d)
which is equivalent to
so the Judge will choose N(j n(1) (1)). Indeed, this argument shows that any symmetric problem will be assigned the Nash point by the Judge, when it occurs.
2. Now consider the second element in the sequence. If Judge does not choose N(j n(1)−1 (1)), he violates either ScInv or Ind w.r.t. the previous date, so the penalty is at least δ min {c, d}. If he does choose N(j n(1)−1 (1)), he is penalized at most
and by the same argument as in the previous step (substituting c, d for a, b),
which implies that the Judge chooses N(j n(1)−1 (1)). In this way we see that we have the Nash choice on the whole sequence.
3. Now let the element that occurs after this sequence be i. If the Judge does not choose N(i), he violates two axioms with respect to the previous occurrence of i in the sequence -namely, ScInv and Ind. The penalty is therefore at least (c + d)δ t for some
On the other hand if he chooses N(i), he at most violates ScInv and Ind with respect to all problems preceding the sequence (from the beginning of the history till Q + 1 periods before) and is therefore penalized by less than
So he will choose N(i) as long as
This is equivalent to
which is true for
4. Assume that the Judge has chosen the Nash point for S periods after the end of the sequence (in the previous step we have shown this to be true for S = 1). Let the element that occurs at S + 1 be i. If the Judge does not choose N(i), he violates at least ScInv and Ind with respect to the previous occurrence of i in the sequence and the penalty is therefore at least (c + d)δ t for some S + 1 ≤ t ≤ S + Q. If he chooses N(i), he at most violates ScInv and Ind with respect to all problems preceding the sequence (from the beginning of the history till S + Q + 1 periods before) and is is penalized by less than
This is true because it is equivalent to
By induction he chooses Nash henceforth.
Although (1) is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the result to hold, we now show that a slightly weaker condition, 0 < δ ≤ b b+c+d , is necessary. Proof. Let D = {i, j} , as described in Fig. 1 . The problem j is symmetric. Let T be an integer satisfying
There is a positive probability (at least π 
This last option is therefore dominated by N(j). We have
which is true by assumption. Therefore the judge picks x.
Consider a period S > T + 1 and assume that x has been chosen at all times before (we know this to be true for S = T + 2). If i occurs, x is picked again without any penalty while any other point costs a penalty. If j occurs, picking x costs b while picking N(j)
By induction, at no period in the future can the Nash point be chosen.
We can now summarize these results in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Assume that for all domains D the random process is regular. A sufficient condition for convergence to N to occur almost surely on all finite domains D for which the Nash theorem holds true is that 0 < δ ≤ the Judge could anticipate that j will occur at some date and that the only way not to incur any penalty is to take N(i) right from the beginning.
Kalai-Smorodinsky
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is denoted KS. One has Let i ∈ D. Condition (KS) holds for i if there exists a sequence j 1 , . . . j n such that j 1 = i, j n is symmetric and for all t = 1, . . . , n − 1, either (i) j t ⊆ j t+1 (or j t ⊇ j t+1 ) and I(j t ) = I(j t+1 ) and KS(j t+1 ) ∈ ∂j t ; or (ii) ∃α ∈ R 2 ++ , j t+1 is an α-rescaling of j t .
Again, and without risk of confusion with the previous section, let us call such a sequence a special chain beginning at i.
Proposition 5 The KS theorem holds on a finite domain D if and only if Condition (KS) holds for all i ∈ D.
The proof of this proposition is tedious and is relegated to the appendix. The complication, in comparison to the proof of Prop. 1, comes from the fact that IMon can relate two problems i, j even if Condition (KS) holds for only one of them. Therefore, a solution which coincides with KS on the subdomain of problems i for which Condition (KS) holds may, via IMon, impose substantial constraints on its selections in the problems i for which
Condition (KS) does not hold. It is not trivial to show that this solution may nonetheless
depart from KS on some of these problems.
It is an open question whether this result is also true for an infinite domain. 
Egalitarian solution
The Egalitarian solution is denoted E. One has Let i ∈ D. Condition (E) holds for i if there exists a sequence j 1 , . . . j n such that j 1 = i, j n is symmetric and for all t = 1, . . . , n − 1, E(j t ) = E(j n ) and either j t ⊆ j t+1 or j t+1 ⊆ j t . Again the sequence j 1 , . . . j n will be called a special chain beginning at i. 
Construct a monotone path P from zero for which the intersection with the 45
• line coincides with Z on R 2 ++ . More precisely, P is the graph of an increasing function f such that f(0) = 0, and Proof. 1. Enumerate the elements of D as 1, 2, . . . , M. For any element i define the special chain beginning at i as i, j 2 (i), ..., j n(i) (i). With probability one, we will get at some point the following sequence of societies:
Suppose this sequence occurs at date T . If E(j n(1) (1)) is not chosen, the penalty will be at least min {a, b}, since either WP or Sym will be violated. If, however, E(j n(1) (1)) is chosen, this will entail at most one violation with respect to all previous choicesnamely, for any previous date, a violation of Mon. So the worst penalty that can be incurred is
The assumption
and (3) is equivalent to
Therefore,
so the Judge will choose E(j n(1) (1)).
2. Now consider the second element in the sequence. If the Judge does not choose E(j n(1)−1 (1)), he violates Mon w.r.t. the previous date, so the penalty is at least δh. If he does choose E(j n(1)−1 (1)), he is penalized at most
One has
and therefore δ/(1 − δ) < 1, implying that h
the Judge chooses E(j n(1)−1 (1)).
3. In this way we see that we have the E choice on the whole sequence.
4. Now let the element that occurs after this sequence be i. If Judge does not choose E(i), he violates one axiom with respect to the previous occurrence of i in the sequence -namely, Mon. The penalty is therefore at least hδ t for some 1 ≤ t ≤ P M j=2 n(j) + 1. (The worst case is that i = 1.) Let Q = P M j=2 n(j) + 1. On the other hand if he chooses E(i), he is penalized by less than
So he will choose E(i) as long as
which holds true as it is equivalent to δ ≤ 1/2.
By induction he chooses E henceforth. This concludes the proof.
Proposition 10 Assume that the random process is regular. If δ = 0 or
there exists a domain D such that Condition (E) holds for all i ∈ D but convergence to the egalitarian solution does not occur almost surely.
Proof. Let D = {i, j} , as described in Fig. 1 . The problem j is symmetric. 
There is a positive probability that history starts with T occurrences of i for T satisfying
Suppose the Judge picks point x for t = 1, ..., T.
Let j occur at t = T + 1. If the Judge chooses E(j) the penalty is h P T t=1 δ t . If he chooses x the penalty is b. If he chooses another point the penalty is either a or b, plus
This last option is therefore dominated by E(j). Noting that
which is true by assumption. Therefore the judge chooses x.
Consider a period S > T + 1 and assume that x has been chosen at all times before (we know this to be true for S = T + 2). If i occurs, x is picked again without any penalty while any other point costs a penalty. If j occurs, choosing x costs b while choosing E(j)
By induction, at no period in the future can the egalitarian point be chosen. 
Conclusion
An interesting fact is that, in the benchmark case, we get convergence to the solution in question (Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky, Egalitarian) precisely when discounting the future is large. This is somewhat counterintuitive: one might have thought that convergence to the solution would occur only if the past was quite important, but it is in fact just the opposite.
Suppose we have a set T of axiomatic theorems of the type we have discussed here, and for each theorem τ ∈ T we prove that in the benchmark case, almost-sure convergence to the appropriate solution occurs if and only if δ ∈ (0, δ τ ]. This provides a way ranking the axiomatic theorems in terms of plausibility: the greater is δ τ , the more plausible is the theorem, in the sense that the dynamic version of the theorem (as developed here) holds for a larger set of discount factors. Thus, we would say that the egalitarian theorem is more plausible than Nash's theorem or Kalai and Smorodinsky's.
To be precise, we are saying that if we observe societies which abide by an egalitarian constitution and societies which abide by a Nash constitution, and discount factors vary across societies randomly, then it is more likely that we will observe allocations looking like the egalitarian solution in the egalitarian societies than allocations looking like the Nash solution in Nash societies, because (0, 1/3] ⊂ (0, 1/2].
We conclude with an anecdote. Many years ago, one of us (Roemer) interviewed a number of functionaries in the World Health Organization (WHO) about how they allocated their budget among member countries, a process that WHO undertakes biennially.
It is not too difficult to think of what country preferences (or utility functions) mean in this context, something that is quite clearly specified in WHO documents. (It is a measure of average health status of persons in the country.) The resource is given by the WHO budget. It is possible to characterize the lexicographic minimum solution ('leximin') by a small number of axioms, and when interviewed, the functionaries all agreed that they would certainly respect these axioms in the budget allocation process. Documents issued by the Organization also stipulated 'norms' for budget allocation which look very much like some of these axioms. Yet an examination of the history of budget allocations shows that nothing like the leximin solution is followed. One possible explanation is that a given administration lasts only for a small number of years, and so judicial precedent does not have time to bite. It is conceivable that the discounting of penalties is not as we have postulated: for the period of the adminisration in power, δ may be quite large, but it becomes zero for dates occurring in earlier administrations. In this case, even if the correct rule is eventually adopted by an administration, the next administration is not constrained by it and may start a new history. A second possible explanation is that, although the functionaries would have liked to implement leximin, they were overruled by the Assembly of WHO, a political body where country representatives fight for all they can get. Not having the present theory to guide him at that time, it did not occur to the co-author to study this question.
Note that if ϕ satisfies WP and ϕ(k) ∈ C ϕ (k; i), necessarily ϕ(i) ∈ C ϕ (i; k). This can be checked for each case:
(i) This also corresponds to case (i) for i : ϕ(k) = ϕ(i) and C ϕ (i; k) = C ϕ (k; i).
(ii) This corresponds to case (iii) for i :
(iii) This corresponds to case (ii) for i :
(iv) This corresponds to case (v) for i :
(v) This corresponds to case (iv) for i : 2) k is not a rescaling of a problem i ∈ D + because otherwise k, i, ... starts a special chain beginning at k, implying that k ∈ D + ;
3) k can be related by IMon to a problem i ∈ D + . But necessarily, either I(k) 6 = I(i) or KS(i) / ∈ ∂k; otherwise, a special chain beginning at k can be formed and thus k ∈ D + .
The set D \ D + can be partitioned into the equivalence classes of the equivalence relation "is a rescaling of". Say that two equivalence classes E, E 0 are "linked" if there
The relation "is linked to" is not transitive in general because it may happen that, for a particular triple E, E 0 , E 00 , E and E 0 are linked via two problems i, i 0 , E 0 and E 00 are linked via j 0 , j 00 , and E and E 00 are not linked. We will also be interested in its transitive closure, called "directly or indirectly linked to".
3. Pick one particular equivalence class E * (for the rescaling relation) and all the equivalence classes that are directly or indirectly linked to it. Call the union of these classes D * . This is a subset of D \ D + (not necessarily a proper subset).
Pick a member of E * , i * . E * and i * will play a special role in the rest of the proof.
If D * 6 = E * , let E be any other equivalence class in D * . Consider first the case in which the equivalence classes E and E * are linked by two problems i ∈ E, j * ∈ E * . Therefore linked, contradicting the fact that k ∈ D * and i ∈ D \ D * .
We now derive consequences from the fact that either I(k) 6 = I(i) or KS(i) / ∈ ∂k whenever k ∈ D * and i ∈ D \ D * are related by IMon. Consider first the case I(k) 6 = I(i). Four subcases are possible:
Focus on the first subcase, the other subcases being similar. Because this first subcase corresponds to k ⊆ i, I 1 (k) = I 1 (i) and
Therefore KS(k), which is obviously an element of C KS (k; i), satisfies KS 2 (k)/KS 1 (k) < x 2 /x 1 and is not an extreme point of C KS (k; i). Consider the second case, KS(i) / ∈ ∂k.
As the subcase in which I(k) 6 = I(i) has already been examined, we can focus on the subcase in which I(k) = I(i). One then has either
and again KS(k) is not an extreme point of C KS (k; i).
For every
. This set contains KS(k) and KS(k) is not an extreme point of it, because these two properties are satisfied by each of the C KS (k; i), of which there is a finite number.
Take any k * ∈ D * . Let E be its equivalence class. For every k ∈ E, there is α ∈ R 2 ++ such that k * is an α-rescaling of k. Let C| k * (k) denote the α-rescaling of C(k). This is a subset of ∂k * . Note that KS(k * ) is an α-rescaling of KS(k). As KS(k) is a non-extreme element of C(k), then KS(k * ) is a non-extreme element of C| k * (k). Therefore the subset T k∈E C| k * (k) contains KS(k * ) and KS(k * ) is not an extreme point of this subset. Let C * (k * ) denote this subset. Note that when k is a rescaling of k 0 , C * (k) is a rescaling of
Take any i E ∈ D * * , where E is an equivalence class in D * . Recall that i E / ∈ D * but i E is a rescaling of each member of E. The subset T k∈E C| i E (k) contains KS(i E ) and KS(i E ) is not an extreme point of this subset. Let C * (i E ) denote this subset. Note that for all k ∈ E, C * (i E ) is a rescaling of C * (k).
6. Now let us look again at the particular i * and all the i E (that may belong to D * or D * * ) that were introduced in step 3. One has I(i * ) = I(i E ) and therefore KS 2 (i * )/KS 1 (i * ) = KS 2 (i E )/KS 1 (i E ) for all E in D * , while KS(i * ) is not an extreme point of C * (i * ) just as KS(i E ) is not an extreme point of C * (i E ). Therefore there is μ ∈ R 2 ++ , μ 6 = KS 2 (i * )/KS 1 (i * ) such that the point x ∈ ∂i * such that x 2 /x 1 = μ belongs to C * (i * ) and for all E in D * , the point x ∈ ∂i E such that x 2 /x 1 = μ belongs to C * (i E ).
Now we are ready to define a solution ϕ as follows. On D \ D * , it coincides with KS.
For k ∈ D * , there is α ∈ R
2
++ and E in D * such that k is an α-rescaling of i E (or i * ); then ϕ(k) is the point x ∈ ∂k such that x 2 /x 1 = (α 2 /α 1 )μ. Note that, as C * (k) is a α-rescaling of C * (i E ) (or of C * (i * )), this implies that ϕ(k) ∈ C * (k).
7. It is obvious that ϕ satisfies WP, Sym and ScInv. It also obviously satisfies IMon on D \ D * .
Consider two problems k ∈ D * , i ∈ D\D * that are related by IMon. By construction, ϕ(k) ∈ C * (k) ⊂ C(k) ⊂ C KS (k; i) = C ϕ (k; i), where the last equality is due to ϕ(i) = KS(i). And conversely this implies ϕ(i) ∈ C ϕ (i; k).
Consider two problems i, k ∈ D * that are related by IMon. First case: If they belong to the same equivalence class, IMon is satisfied because it is implied by ScInv in this case. Second case: Suppose i is a rescaling of i E , k a rescaling of i E 0 (one problem among i E , i E 0 may be i * ). One has ϕ 2 (i E )/ϕ 1 (i E ) = ϕ 2 (i E 0 )/ϕ 1 (i E 0 ) = μ. Without loss of generality, suppose that i ⊆ k and I 1 (i) = I 1 (k). If I 2 (i) = I 2 (k), then i and k are α-rescalings of i E and i E 0 , respectively, for the same α (recall that I(i E ) = I(i E 0 ) = I(i * )). 
